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GOD AND THE ARGUMENT FROM CONSCIOUSNESS: 
A RESPONSE TO LIM
J. P. MORELAND
Biola University
recently, Daniel lim has published a thoughtful critique of one form of 
my argument for the existence of God from consciousness (hereafter, 
AC).1 After stating his presentation of the relevant contours of my 
argument, I shall present the main components of his critique, followed 
by my response. Since one purpose of my publications of AC has been to 
foster discussion about a neglected argument for God’s existence, I am 
thankful to lim for his interesting article and the chance to further the 
discussion.
lIm’S PreSeNTATIoN oF mY DeDuCTIVe VerSIoN oF AC
lim claims that my presentation of AC is essentially a God-of-the-gaps 
argument and offers this version of it:
(1) Genuinely non-physical mental states exist.
(2) There is an explanation for the existence of mental states.
(3) Personal explanation is different from natural scientific explanation.
(4) The explanation for the existence of mental states is either a perso-
nal or natural scientific explanation.
(5) The explanation is not a natural scientific one.
1 Daniel lim, “Zombies, epiphenomenalism, and Personal explanation: A Tension in 
moreland’s Argument from Consciousness”, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 
3/2 (Autumn, 2011), 439-450.
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(6) Therefore, the explanation is a personal one.
(7) If the explanation is personal, then it is theistic.
(8) Therefore, the explanation is theistic.
lim focuses on four reasons I have offered for (5), and spends 
the entirety of his subsequent critique on an alleged tension between 
(b) and (c) below. Those reasons are (a) the uniformity of nature, (b) 
the contingency of the mind-body correlation, (c) the rejection of 
epiphenomenalism based on causal closure, and (d) the inadequacy 
of evolutionary explanations.
lIm’S CrITIQue oF AC
lim claims that the contingency of the mental/physical connection (which 
he calls “Contingency” with a capital “C”) is crucial for my argument 
because it makes room for a personal explanation of that connection. 
Further and in general, contingency is required for a personal explanation 
since the offering of a theistic personal explanation seems to presuppose the 
contingency of the phenomenon to be explained. Applied to Contingency, 
in this way the explanans (God’s free choice to make the connection the 
way it is) comports well with the explanandum (Contingency). Thus, 
Contingency is a necessary condition for a successful AC.
In addition, according to lim, the falsity of epiphenomenalism, given 
a robust version of naturalism, is important for my defence of premise (5) 
of AC (the explanation of the existence of mental entities is not a natural 
scientific one). briefly, lim says my argument is that naturalism implies 
the causal closure of the physical, closure implies epiphenomenalism for 
irreducible mental states, epiphenomenalism is false, so naturalism is 
false. Thus, there is no naturalistic explanation for irreducible mental 
states.
At this point in his critique, lim claims that there is now a tension 
in my defence of AC: my rejection of epiphenomenalism is at odds 
with my commitment to Contingency because Contingency entails 
epiphenomenalism as as expressed in C4:
C4: Contingency → epiphenomenalism
Now, prima facie, C4 seems implausible. Indeed, numerous thinkers 
in the history of philosophy, not to mention most laypeople throughout 
the world, both now and throughout history, have accepted Contingency 
and a denial of epiphenomenalism. So C4 needs a pretty robust defence 
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and lim seeks to provide one. First, he invites us to consider the “standard” 
ways of characterizing zombies (e.g., something physically identical 
to me but bereft of mental states) in a world physically identical to the 
actual world. In such a world, my zombie twin is physically, functionally 
and behaviourally identical to me in the actual world. let PWZ and PW@ 
stand for a zombie world and the actual world, respectively. The only 
difference between these worlds is that metal states obtain in the latter 
and not the former. but, then, it becomes clear, says lim, that the 
presence or absence of mental states makes no causal contribution to 
PW@, and this is why C4 is true. So in my version of AC, either I accept 
Contingency or I reject it. If I reject it, there is no need for a personal 
theistic explanation of the correlations, and if I accept it, I must accept an 
implausible view which, in fact, I reject, viz., epiphenomenalism.
However, lim suggests I have a way out and that would be to reject 
C4. epiphenomenalism can be avoided if the zombie world PWZ is 
missing something the actual world PW@ has, namely, the laws of 
nature (which are different in the two worlds). mental states could be 
causally efficacious in PW@ as long as PWZ is a counter-nomological 
world, i.e., one with different laws of nature. This solution is available if 
we accept Categoricalism (all properties are categorical, i.e., they don’t 
confer any causal powers/dispositions on their bearers), and depict the 
laws of nature as metaphysically contingent relations among categorical 
properties such that these laws contingently confer causality “from the 
outside” on their relata.2 Thus, in PW@ there are contingent mental/
physical causal laws that vouchsafe the causal efficacy of the mental that 
do not obtain in PWZ.
As an illustration, lim invites us to suppose that in PW@, my mental 
states and brain states together bring about my shouting “ouch” (i.e., 
(m&P) → e). Now, e won’t obtain in PWZ because m is absent. but 
then, PWZ does not satisfy the “standard” analysis of zombies embedded 
in a  physically indistinguishable world. To get such a world, we need 
PWZ-lAW in which the laws of nature differ from those in PW@. In PW@, 
there is a law such as (m&P) → e. but in PWZ-lAW, there is a different 
law that guarantees that P alone brings about e. In this case we have 
contingency with respect to two physically indistinguishable worlds 
PW@ and PWZ-lAW, and mental efficacy is preserved in PW@.
2 For a helpful discussion of Categoricalism and Dispositional essentialism, see 
Alexander bird, “laws and essences”, Ratio 18 (2005), 437-461.
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unfortunately, this is not a satisfactory way out for the defender of 
AC, and lim presents two main arguments against it. First, he claims that 
it is unclear that we can preserve the physical identity of some brain state 
P from PW@ to PWZ-lAW because some strong version of Dispositional 
essentialism is superior to Categoricalism regarding properties and their 
identity conditions, the former can and the latter cannot adequately 
ground P’s physical identity between the two worlds, yet it is the inferior 
Categoricalism that funds this way out for the defender of AC. let us 
characterize Strong Dispositional essentialism (SDe) in this way:
SDe: Some properties are essentially dispositional, those dispositions 
ground and are metaphysically necessarily connected to the laws 
into which those properties figure, and two properties Q and r are 
identical if and only if, necessarily, Q and r share all and only the 
same dispositions.
According to SDe, laws of nature are not contingently related to 
properties. rather, a law of nature involving a property Q is grounded 
in and metaphysically necessarily related to Q’s dispositions such that 
Q cannot exist in two possible worlds in association with two different 
related laws of nature. So brain state P that essentially instantiates some 
property Q does not preserve its identity between PW@ and PWZ-lAW.3
Second, lim claims that PWZ-lAW is a red herring in any case, and it is 
not really relevant to the problem of epiphenomenalism. Why? because 
if PWZ is really possible, a world identical to PW@ in every way, this alone 
establishes epiphenomenalism.
In sum, I have presented a precis of lim’s critique of my version 
of AC, especially my defence of premise (5). I now turn to the task of 
providing a reply to lim.
mY rePlY To lIm’S CrITIQue
In this section, I shall present two initial responses to lim, followed by 
a reply to his main contention about Contingency and epiphenomenalism.
3 lim also raises an epistemological worry, namely, if physical properties and their 
instantiations can exist throughout a range of possible worlds with various causal profiles 
for those properties and instantiations, not only would this be unparsimonious, but it 
would generate vast ranges of empirically equivalent possible worlds with radically 
different underlying property-ontologies. Now besides the fact that opponents of realism 
in science would be happy with this latter result, I shall not interact with this criticism 
further because, as we shall see below, I am not a Categoricalist.
247GoD AND THe ArGumeNT From CoNSCIouSNeSS
God-of-the-Gaps and Necessitation
lim claims that my version of AC is a God-of-the-gaps argument, 
but he is simply wrong in this.4 A gaps argument is one in which 
a  scientific explanation of some phenomenon is possible in principle, 
but not yet provided, and into that explanatory gap a rival theistic 
explanation is proffered. but my defence of premise (5) of AC, especially 
(b) contingency, (c), epiphenomenalism, and (d) the inadequacy of 
evolutionary explanations, provide in-principle objections to the very 
possibility of scientific explanation. Whether successful or not, they 
seek to place a limit on scientific explanation regarding the existence of 
mental entities, to claim that they must, therefore, be taken as brute facts 
or explained theistically, and to provide grounds for preferring a theistic 
explanation. Thus, my argument is not a gaps-type presentation. This is 
not a minor point. In the current intellectual climate, there is widespread 
loathing for gaps arguments, and it would be damaging to AC if one were 
to think, erroneously, that it is a gaps argument.
Second, lim’s claim that a defender of AC needs Contingency 
(the contingency of the mental/physical connection) is mistaken. Put 
briefly, the defender of AC needs contingency but not Contingency. The 
existence of the mental must, in some way or another, be a contingent 
fact, but its emergence from the physical need not be. Consider the 
following possibility. Suppose that mental states emergently supervened 
upon relevant brains states with metaphysical necessity. In this case, 
Contingency would be violated. However, a defender of AC could ask 
why those contingent subvenient brain states obtained as opposed to 
alternative states. If the relevant brain states were the result of a causal 
chain of events leading back to the big bang, the AC advocate could ask 
why this chain as opposed to an alternative one obtained in the actual 
world. And a personal theistic explanation would be available (e.g., the 
properties of consciousness are exemplified by the fundamental being in 
theism; thus, they exist and are available for subsequent exemplification 
in the history of the cosmos; good persons – divine or otherwise – love to 
4 elsewhere, I have evaluated God-of-the-gaps arguments in the context of debates 
about whether or not methodological naturalism is a necessary condition for the practice 
of science. See J. P. moreland, “Theistic Science and methodological Naturalism” in The 
Creation Hypothesis, edited by J. P. moreland (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity 
Press, 1994), pp. 41-66.
248 J. P. morelAND
bring other persons into existence and have relationships with them, so 
God would have a good reason to being about those subvenient states).
Now, I accept Contingency so this way out is not one I can embrace. but 
I do embrace the contingency of physical states that are causally relevant 
for the appearance of mental states, so in my case, both sorts of AC are 
available. And in any case, an AC advocate who denied Contingency 
could still advance an AC type argument as we have seen, and this fact 
is sufficient to defeat lim’s argument. Still, since I accept Contingency, 
I  have to face the tension between it and epiphenomenalism which 
I reject. And it is to this issue we now turn.
Contingency and Epiphenomenalism: Problems with C4
I have two basic responses to lim’ employment of C4 (Contingency 
→ epiphenomenalism) to expose a tension in my arguments for AC’s 
premise (5). The first one is epistemological. As I mentioned earlier, the 
vast majority of people throughout history have accepted Contingency 
and denied epiphenomenalism, including a very impressive number of 
philosophers down through the ages. belief in some sort of disembodied 
life after death is ubiquitous, people have no problem with the 
(metaphysical) possibility of Near Death experiences, zombies frequently 
populate science fiction writing, and when presented with an explanation 
of inverted qualia thought experiments, lay people clearly believe they 
could, indeed, happen. And almost no one accepts epiphenomenalism. 
If there is any place where the intuitions of folk ontology should count, 
and I and many others think they should, this is it.
but the same thing cannot be said for the highly abstract debates 
about identity conditions for properties, the proper analysis of laws of 
nature, how the two relate to one another, and so forth. one could take 
oneself to have a principled, justified position on these topics, but one’s 
underlying intuitions would be far weaker than those of folk ontology 
supporting Contingency and a denial of epiphenomenalism. Given this 
epistemic disparity, it seems to me that one could be justified in accepting 
Contingency and denying epiphenomenalism without having any reply 
to C4. or one could reject C4 by opting for, say, a Humean regularity 
view of laws, or Armstrong’s nomic necessitation view, precisely because 
they preserve these folk ontological intuitions, even if, considered in 
themselves, one preferred Strong Dispositional essentialism to these 
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alternatives.5 It seems to me that this is the epistemology of the situation, 
and lim does not take it into account. Thus, lim’s statement “that AC in 
its present form cannot be used to persuade naturalistic dualists” (p. 449) 
is unwarranted and premature.
So much for my epistemological observation. my second reply to 
lim takes as a starting point his concession that epiphenomenalism can 
be avoided as long as the zombie world PWZ is in some relevant way 
different from the actual world PW@. In a related comment Timothy 
o’Connor has observed that if an emergent property is depicted in such 
a way as to be contingently linked to the base properties causing it to 
emerge, then apart from an appeal to God’s contingent choice that things 
be so, and to God’s stable intention that they continue to be so, there will 
be no explanation for the link itself or its constancy.6 lim’s mistake is his 
suggestion that a Categoricalist depiction of contingent laws of nature 
is the only way out. but this is mistaken. There is an alternative for an 
AC advocate that rejects Categoricalism, embraces a mitigated form of 
Dispositional essentialism, and provides the resources to defeat C4. let 
me explain.
Consider this form of mitigated Dispositional essentialism (mDe):
mDe: Some properties, e.g., P, are essentially dispositional in that 
they have dispositions, e.g., DI-DN, and these dispositions, along with 
the intrinsic categorical nature of, e.g., P, together provide the identity 
conditions for P. In addition, properties like P can have accidental 
dispositions Do-DS that are not essential to P.
Among other things, mDe entails that not all the dispositions of 
a given property are essential to its identity. Thus, a property – or a state 
essentially characterized by a property – can retain its identity though 
accidental change. Given mDe, my response to lim amounts to the 
claim that the difference between PW@ and PWZ resides in a difference 
in accidental dispositions. mDe provides a way for properties and 
their associated states to retain identity across possible worlds. And 
by providing an account in which the actual and a zombie world are 
duplicates physically but not duplicates simpliciter, mDe provides the 
resources for defeating C4 while granting the existence of PWZ. Thus, 
5 For a recent metaphysical analysis of options on these matters, see e. J. lowe, The 
Four-Category Ontology (oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), pp. 121-173.
6 Timothy o’Connor, Persons and Causes (New York: oxford university Press, 2000), 
pp. 70-71.
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mDe preserves Contingency and a rejection of epiphemonenalism, and 
at the same time provides answers to lim’s two criticisms. Now consider 
the following two scenarios:
Scenario one: let us set aside the “standard” account of zombies as 
expressed in PWZ, in favour of a “non-standard account expressed in 
PWNSZ (a non-standard zombie world). Such a world is bereft of mental 
states and their causal effects (e.g., there is no shouting of “ouch”). Such 
a world seems possible, and it is all a defender of AC needs. After all, the 
point of zombies in AC is to illustrate the contingency of the existence of 
the mental, and that is captured in PWNSZ. Now suppose that in the actual 
world, there is a disposition of a subvenient base physical property that, 
when triggered, actualizes the mental property. What are we to say about 
this disposition in PWNSZ? It seems that there are two ways to go. First, 
one can say that in the actual world, this disposition was an accidental 
property superadded and sustained by God, but is missing in PWNSZ. 
Since this disposition plays no role in physical theory nor is it strictly 
a physical disposition capable of complete description in ideal physical 
terms (it’s description involves reference to a mental entity), then the non-
standard world is physically identical to the actual world, but absent the 
relevant metaphysical (non-physical) disposition. or one can say that in 
PWNSZ, the disposition to produce a mental state is present, but that God 
has superadded and sustains an overriding blocking disposition. either 
way, Contingency and a rejection of epiphenomenalism are preserved, 
PWNSZ is in place, and the relevant property identities are retained across 
the two worlds.
Scenario Two: Here we adopt the “standard” account of zombies and 
consider PWZ in which the brain state P causes e (a shouting of “ouch”). 
In the actual world, there is a set of non-physical, contingent dispositions 
that are relevant to the existence of the mental and its causal powers that 
are absent in the zombie world. What are those dispositions? I’m not 
sure, and I am not sure a detailed account of them is required for my 
argument. but I can speculate. Suppose in PW@ there are six dispositions 
absent from PWZ:7 the mental disposition mD that, when actualized, 
gives rise to m, a disposition of mD that gives mD the potential to 
receive causal power from the subvenient base, a disposition of that 
7 In a related project with very different aims, Colin mcGinn postulates three 
dispositional properties and not six. See his The Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds in a 
Material World (New York: basic books, 1999).
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subvenient base to interact with mD’s disposition to broker the causal 
activity that actualizes mD, a disposition of m to act causally on matter 
(e.g., to produce the bodily motions involved in shouting “ouch”), the 
various bodily dispositions to receive mental causal activity, and an 
overriding/blocking disposition that prevents b from causing e without 
m’s involvement. In this scenario, we have Contingency, a rejection of 
epiphenomenalism, and an intact PWZ.
lim could reject my two scenarios on the grounds that their associated 
zombie worlds are not adequate. In one place, lim describes the adequacy 
relationship between two worlds relevant to our topic as “being identical 
in every way” (p. 448), and my two zombie worlds fail this criterion when 
compared to the actual world. but this characterization substantially begs 
the question against the defender of AC. more importantly, it is equivocal 
to what lim says elsewhere when he describes the adequacy relationship 
as requiring the two relevant worlds to be physically identical, including 
physical events. This, I take it, is lim’s actual view. If I am right about this, 
then my two zombie worlds satisfy this adequacy condition compared to 
the actual world, and my scenarios defeat lim’s critique.
In summary, I am grateful to lim for his thoughtful critique of my 
argument for God from the existence of irreducible, uneliminable mental 
states. but, as I have tried to show, I do not believe his critique succeeds.8
8 lim concludes his critique by claiming that a solution relevantly similar to mine 
requires a rejection of closure, but since the purpose of AC is to persuade naturalistic 
property dualists, and since rejecting closure is unavailable to the naturalist, it would be 
dialectically useless to undermine C4 by rejecting closure. but lim’s remarks misconstrue 
the use of closure in defence of (5), viz., as a reductio against property dualist naturalists. 
The argument is that, given the most plausible version of naturalism, a natural scientific 
explanation of consciousness would entail closure, closure entails epiphenomenalism, 
epiphenomenalism is false, and so is closure and a natural scientific explanation of 
consciousness. If the falsity of C4 entails a denial of epiphenomenalism, so much the 
better for my defence of (5).
